that Hitler th.en had victory almost within his grasp, This account gives little evidence to support such a view. On the contrary} the effectiveness of the defenders showed a steady increase, leading in October to the practical abandonment of mass daylight assaults. With the resort to ' night bombing came an end to the German hope of a swift victory and a retreat to the methods of attrition implicit in night bombing.
We need not underestimate the seriousness of the results which German night bombing has since achieved. But however shocking they may be, thejr true significance is to be measured by the extent to which they fall short of the German goal and the increasing note of wishful thinking in German pronouncements. Last April, for instance, Field Marshal Kesserling wrote: "I regard ·the purpose of the Luftwaffe in a total war by its very nature to have been achieved when lands are attacked, power centres annihilated, and the capacity of the people to resist smashed, so that occupation can follow more or less without a fight." That is very far from the arrogant directness of purpose which marked the air assault of last autumn. It is also a prospect which even the attacks of the past nine months have brought very little nearer. Indeed, the pronouncement of the more realistic General Kabisch last November still seems to be the last word. "The German people indulge in the optimistic view that the war can be won -by the Luftwaffe. The fact remains that the onJy way to win is by getting troops into England." On that basis we have good reason to look forward with sober confidence to the ultimate outcome.
BRITAIN'S HOME GUARD
WHEN the history of the present war comes to be written the Home Guard will deserv~e at least a separate chapter. It may deserve very much more if it should have been actively engaged in military operations; but it will not be so engaged, according to present arrangements, unless the Germans should effect a landing in Great Britain. That, at the time of writing, seems highly improbable. ((Here in London," said Mr Churchill, "we are still waiting for the long promised invasion. So are the fishes." I t could be argued that one of the more superficial reasons why the Germans will lose the war is that their capacity for thorough, laborious, ant-like organization is surpassed by the British capacity for improvisation to meet an emergency. Until the capitulation of France everything had gone, in the characteristic phrase originally , invented by the German High Command, "according to plan." Since that event it has gradually become apparent that the plan had not allowed for the continuance of the struggle by Great Britain alone. Lord Halifax, who usually weighs his words, has told an audience of American journalists that "Hitler ... lost the war in June, 1940, when he failed to take advantage of the situation existing after the collapse of France. England was then at her weakest, and Germany might have bee~ able to cash in if she had acted quickly."l More recently Mr Churchill has lent his authority to the statement that "Hitler took it more or less for gra.nted when France gave in that we should give in too. We did not give in, and he had to think again."2 The Germans are not good at thinking again, and their second thoughts were slow and uninspired.
It is common knowledge that the emergency found Great Britain unprepared, and that such preparation as could be made at the moment of crisis might well have proved unavailing if it had been put to the test immediately. According to some observers the public took the danger too lightly, and it is true that there were no obvio~s signs of excitement except that "invasion stories"J superseded "Hitler and Mussolini stories" as the most popular form of humour; but there was real determination beneath the outward levity, and Mr Churchill had no reason to be disappointed with the response to his broadcast speeches. The British, like the Germans, had -to think again. Unlike the Germans~ who could form new plans at their leisure, they had to think quickly, and to act -at' the same time; or, when that was impossible, to act first and think afterwards. The Home Guard, as it is now called, was one of -a number of innovations which scrambled into existence almost imperceptibly, and have already, in a few months, adapted IDaily Tdegraph, Jan. 27, 1941. 2Speech broadcast on Feb. 9, 1941. 30ne of these stories, alleged to be true, and typical of dozens, may be offered as a-specimen. A farm.labourer in East Kent enquired why so many soldiers had suddenly appeared in the neighbourhood, and was told that they expected soon to be fighting a battle against a foreign invader. He is said to have replied: "They can't have a battle in this village, because the green isn't big enough and Squire wouldn't lend his park." themselves to so many changes and developments that their small beginnings are difficult to recognize.
In watching the campaign in Poland, Norway, and the Low Countries, everyone had been impressed by the success with which the Germans had employed small bodies of gangsters and desperadoes, landed by parachute in all sorts of disguises, to wreck the defences of their victims far in advance of the invading armies. In spite of the obvious difficulties it was thought that the experiment might be repeated in this country, and it was suggested that farmers, sportsmen, gamekeepers,4 and, generally, persons accustomed to the use of firearms, should carry a gun with them in case they should notice a parachutist descending into the back . garden. The analogy sometimes quoted was that of the Boer farmers, who for years before the South African War had carried a rifie, for use against a possible invader, while pursuing their ordinary occupations. This proposal met with very little encouragement. One group of critics raised questions of legality, of which more was heard later; another pointed out the danger that a British piJot who had bailed out as the result of an accident might be mistaken for an enemy; others entertained themselves with horrific visions of a dozen or more Germans, armed with all the most murderous weapons which an aeroplane can carry, being challenged by a breathless Master of Foxhounds flourishing a shot-gun. It is not to be denied that the scheme in its earliest and crudest form deserved. much of the ridicule which was poured upon it; but it was not more ridiculous than the alternative sponsored by The Times and, for a moment, sanctioned by the government. 6 On May 11, 1940, The Times observed in a leading article that Ilparachuting may be tried in this country," and continued: "Many of our readers ... have. already written to ask what is the correct manner of dealing with these missionaries 41 t would be true to add poachers, whose deadly aim and exhaustive knowl. edge of their locality were to find legitimate scope in national defence. I am not sure about professional burglars, but I should not be surprised jf some of them were included. 51 cannot give chapter and verse, but I remember that about this time a request was broadcast to the public on behalf of the Ministry of Horne Security to the effect that anyone seeing an airman descending in his neighbourhood by . means of a parachute should report the occurrence to the nearest police station, giving details of the time and place. It was added that the police would, if they thought it advisable, communicate with the mIlitary authorities.
of Hitlerism dropping from the sky, if they land in country places .
. . . It is the duty of the nearest military command to deal with them. The duty of the civilian is to report what he has seen as accurately as possible to the police." \\That the "missionaries of Hitlerism" would be doing while he was pondering his report was not for the dutiful civilian to consider; but it would certainly have forced itself upon his attention, however dutiful he might be, when he discovered that the telephone wires had been cut. The police, if ever the report reached them, would encounter the same difficulty when they came to comm~nicate with "the nearest miLitary command."
If this should give an unfavourable impression of the competence of the ruling authorities, it may be reassuring to remember that on the previous day, May 10, lVlr Chamberlain had brought his disastrous premiership to an end. On the evening of the fourteenth, Mr Eden, the new Secretary for War, took up the question of aerial invasion in a broadcast to the nation.
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After describing the purpose and method of attacks by parachute troops, as observed in other countries, he continued:
We want large numbers of ... men in Great Britain who are British subjects, between the ages of 17 and 65, to come forward now and offer their services in order to make a~surance doubly sure. The name of the new force which is. now to be raised will be the "Local Defence Volunteers." This name, Local Defence Volunteers, describes its duties in three words. It must be understood that this is, so to speak, a spare-time job, so there will be no need for any volunteer to abandon his present occupation .... -This appeal is directed chiefly to those who live in small towns, villages, and less densely populated suburban areas. I must warn you that, for certain military reasons, there will be some localities where the numbers required will be small, and others where your services will not be required at all. Here, then, is the opportunity for which so many of you have been waiting. 6It is probable that Mr Eden was influenced in some degree by a letter addressed to The Times by the Duke of Montrose, and appearing on the day of his broadcast. The Duke proposed the formation of a liN ationa! Guard," to be composed of volunteers accustomed to the use of a rifle but not likely to be required for military service. "These men might be organised on a 'Commando, basis for regional operations. They would not wear uniform but a simple armlet. They would not receive payment except when on service. . .. Their duty would be to attack, snipe or round up the air soldiers, or parachutists, as quickly as possible, and also to act as guides to any troops that may come to operate in the district!' So far as this scheme differs from. Mr Eden's, it is a more exact forecast of the form which the Home Guard was to assume by the middle of July, when it first acquired that name.
This broadcast has now passed in to history. The response proved that public opinion was moving farther and faster than the government, and perhaps with a clearer vision. General Eastwood, now Inspector-General of the Home Guard, has revealed recentl y 7 that the \Var Office had decided upon 150,000 as a liberal estimate of the number of volunteers likely to present themselves. Actually, though Mr Eden's address lasted for less than twenty minutes, the first offers of service were received before he had finished speaking. The next morning there were 250,000; within two days there were a million, and it was not long before a further halfmillion brought the potential strength of the new force up to ten times the number which Mr Eden had expected.
Though we cannot know what went on behind the scenes, except in so far as the veil may be lifted by such revelations as that of General Eastwood, there is reason to believe that this embarras tie richesse 'was vlewed with some perplexity. The government was in no hurry to enrol the volunteers, and some districts, growing impatient, took the matter into their own 'hands and made their own arrangements. This explains some curious facts mentioned without comment in a recent book: "In some areas the officers of the L.D.V. were appointed by the secretary of the golf club. In other places the sergeant in charge of the police station decided the commands and in others the local Vicar took charge. "8 The truth is that there still remain, after centuries of parliamentary government) relics of the old belief in the wisdom of thanes, aldermen, and knights of the shire, and it is natural, at a time of crisis, to turn to a Jocal chieftain rather than wait for the word of command from London. The men of Wessex would have acted in much the 7In a broadcast speech on Feb. 7, 1941. 8Hugh Slater, Home Guard jor riC/Dry, p. 12. I have quoted this because it conveys a true impression, but it is not quite accurate as a statement of fact.
H ever the local Vicar took charge the case must have been exceptional, as the Archbishop of Canterbury had refused permission to the clergy to join the Local Defence Volunteers in accordance with the rule forbidding them to join a com. batant force except as chaplains. The allusion to 'the choice of "officers" also needs some qualification. 1t was at first decided that there should be no commissions in the Local Defence Volunteers, and, though this decision was reconsidered at the end of 1940, when the force had assumed greater importance as the Home Guard, the first commissions have only just been granted at the time of writing, with effect from February 1. The "officers" to whom Mr Slater refers would be local organizers who had consented to act provisionally, though most of them would have held commissions in the last war. same way while waiting for King Alfred to lead them against the Danes.
The government) in the meantime, was taking precautions against infiltrations by a possible Fifth Column. It was not enough to be of British nationality, as Mr Eden's words had implied. Every completed form was scrutinized by the authorities of Scotland Yard, who, before approving it, satisfied themselves 'that the applicant was not only a British subject but of British descent for at least two generations, that he had not been connected with any disloyal organization such as the disbanded British Union of Fascists, that he h~d no foreign affiliations such as to justify suspicion) and generally that, as the local police usually expressed ,it, "we know nothing against him." Thus the first elimination was effected. The second was much more drastic. It was only in the obviously vulnerable areas, with scattered populations, that there was room for every suitable volunteer. In London and the large towns, where many were called, very few were chosen. 9 The only people who were reasonably certain of being required were Bisley marksmen, prize-winning members of rifle clubs, and African explorers whose lives had depended on their ability to shoot straight; for i~ was s-till assumed that the primary function of the Volunteers would be to wing the descending parachutist before he could attempt any mischief. The force was still in this embryonic state at the end of June, the month of the evacuation of Dunkirk and the collapse of France. It had no training and no regular duties, and its only weapons-as all the rifles were needed by the regular Army-were shot-guns, old service revolvers, or w~atever the individual members might happen to possess. Looking back upon that critical period, we can understand Lord Halifax's feeling that Hitler missed the best chance he was ever likely' to have. The principal-reason for his hesitation, as is generally agreed, was the inability of the German mind to adapt its cast-iron plans to a new situation; but the mere existence of the Volunteers may have been a contributory cause, 91 cannot say what the usual proportion was, but it is within my own knowledge that a retired naval Commander who had been made responsi hIe for a certain area had instructions not to accept more than two hundred of the number available. He already had over a thousand completed forms, all approved by Scotland Yard, and the end was not in sight. The Commander's comments on the problem before him had a certain nautical ring.
for it is probable that the Germans imagined it to be a far more formidable obstacle than it actually was. All that can be said with c~rtajnty is that the German Propaganda Department was never tired of abusing that nefarious gang of criminals, bandits, and murderers, which Mr Churchill was supposed to be organizing 'for the discomfiture of the Herrenvolk. Presumably it derived its information from Mr Eden's appeal, from occasional allusions in news buIIetins to the vast numbers who had responded, and, most _ of all, from the English newspapers; for the newspapers had devoted a large amount of space to accounts and discussions of the movement, and may, unwittingly, have given theenemy a false impression of its strength.
There was) in fact, about the end of June and the first half of July, a somewhat acute controversy. The Local Defence Volunteers had no uniform except a detachable armlet, usually kept ip reserve to be worn on special occasions; the officers, who would be more correctly descri bed as leaders, or local organizers, depended on the kind of loyalty which a football team renders to the captain, and could not, in the last resort, have enforced their commands; the rank and file were not bound by an oath of allegiance, and were free at any time to give fourteen days' notice of their intention to resign.l o It was' contended that a body so constituted was not a combatant force according to international law, and that, should it ever be in action, the enemy would be justified in treating its members as franc-tireurs. The natural and obvious reply, that the Germans could not appeal to rules which they had themselves violated in every clause and section, was not made in responsible quarters. , The defenders of the Volunteers argued that international law does, in fact, allow the civilian population of an invaded country to take up arms in self-defence, and that the lOlt was stated officially that the number who had availed themselves of this privilege dU,ring the first six months was less than 5,000, out of a total of approximately 1,500,000. This isa remarkably small proportion when it is considered that a Home Guardsman was expected, and, in fact, required, to give priority to his ordinary work if that work was of a kind essential to the prosecution of the war. In the early days, before there was any regular training, there could be no question of a clash of duties; but as parades and instruction began to assume greater importance, and to demand more time, many of those who were already working long hours in munition factories must have found it impossible to continue. The number of resignations for merely frivolous O{ inadequate reasons was, there is every reason to believe, negligible.
Germans, when they lived in fear of French aggression) had been the strongest upholders of that right. We will not pursue the debate into its finer intricacies; it is enough to say that each side could make out a case, and that no conclusion was ever reached.
There were critics of another school of thought who concerned themselves less with academic and legal subtleties than with the practical exigencies of the situation. It was most unlikely) they argued, that parachute troops would dare to perform their tricks in a densely populated country where they could not hope to land unobserved-; and where they could not be reinforced, as in countries contiguous to Germany, by advancing bodies of infantry; but, if they should be so rash, the r~gular Army would attend to them. The really serious danger, it was said, was from the enemy within the gates. It was known that there was a Quisling in England, ready and eager to set up as a Dictator in subordination to Hitler, and though he, with the Goerings and Ribbentrops of the movement, was now rehearsing his part behind the walls of Brixton Prison, his lesser followers were probably going about unrecognized. The thousands of refugees from the occupied countries also caused uneasiness, for it was virtually certain that there were Nazi agents among them.
It was proposed, accordingly, that the Volunteers should act as a kind of auxiliary Police Force, to guard against spying and sabotage, and for a short time this alternative plan seemed to find favour. Nothing more was heard of those "military reasons" which had induced Mr Eden to exclude the great centres of population from the scope of his appeal. The numerous applicants who had been rejected as superfluous were invited to offer themselves again, and were, as a rule, accepted. The force) thus augmented, was supplied with police truncheons) -though those who had revolvers of their own still carried them. Its principal duty was to guard places of vital importance, such as bridges, reservoirs, factories, and telephone exchanges. The results achieved, though hardly commensurate with the time and' effort expended, were not ' entirely negligible. There are specimens of the Herrenvolk behind bars at the time of writing who might still have been acting the part of whining refugees if they had not been collared by the Volunteers while taking an,interest in aerodromes or gun emplacements.
The beginning of the next, and perhaps the final) phase of development is marked by Mr Churchill's broadcast speech of July 15. It will be remembered that Mr Eden, in commending the name "Local Defence Volunteers," had said that that name described the duties of the force in three words; but now that the Nazis had overrun so much of the Continent that one could smell them (rom Dover,!l the word defence, with all ,its connotations, fell into sudden disrepute. The name of Andre Maginot, formerly held in reverence, became a synonym for every sort of stupidity, compl~cericy, and even cowardice, and it was agreed that, whatever might be done to fortify this island, we must at all costs avoid the errors characteristic of a "Maginot mentality." Mr Churchill, perhaps uhconsciously, interpreted this change of feeling when he said, after speaking of the readiness of the regular Army to resist an invader:
Behind these, as a means of destruction for parachutists, air-borne invaders, and any traitors that maybe found in our midst-and 1 do not believe there are many, woe betide them, they will get short shrift-we have more than a million of the Local Defence Volunteers, or, as they are much better called, the Home Guard. These officers and men, a large proportion of whom have been through 'the last war, have the strongest desire to attack and come to close quarters with the enemy. wherever he may appear.
In recalling these words today it is interesting to notice how the past, present and future are brought together under one comprehensive glance. When Mr Churchill spoke of the destruction of parachutists and air-borne invaders he was reverting to the original function of the Volunteers, now absorbed in a larger scheme; when he included "any traitors that may be found in' our midst" he referred to the police duties which the Volunteers were actually perfo.rming at that moment; when, finally, he proposed a new name from which the word defence was excluded, and spoke of the strong desire of the Home Guard "to attack and come to close quarters . with the enemy," he anticipated a development soon to be realized, but not at that time generally foreseen.
Thus the Local Defence Volunteers became the Home Guard, and efforts were made to give effect to everything implied by the change. Except at certain places, where armed watchfulness was thought supremely necessary, the police duties reverted to the natural custodians of the law, and the police truncheons dis11Mr J. B. Priestley remarked recently, after a visi t to Dover, that Matthew Arnold's histrionics on "Dover Beach" filled him with a strong desire to slap the elegant author on the back and say, "Buddy, you ain't seen nothing." appeared. Every unit came into possession of a sufficiency of rifles and ample stores of ammunition. Most of the time available was ' spent on instructional parades, lectures) and practice in the management of the daintier lethal novelties. A hideous denim uniform was approved by the War Office, and arrived in mountainous quantItIes. A distinguished soldier, General Eastwood, was appointed Inspector-General. One of the stately homes of England, Osterley Park, was len t by the Earl of Jersey to be the Sandhurst or West Point of the Home Guard so long as it should be required. The days of mufti and armlets, of revolvers and shotgUns, of appointments equivalent to flag rank accepted casually over the telephone, faded into the dim and almost incredible past.
In a speech on September 9, Mr Churchill referred to the Home Guard again. He repeated in substance the claim which he had made in July, but this time he was able to state as literal fact what had formerly had the air of prophesy. HOur shores," he said, are well fortified and strongly manned, and behind them, ready ' to attack the invaders, we have a far larger and better equipped mobile army than we have ever had before. Behind this, we have more than 1,500,000 men of the Horne Guard, who are just as much soldiers of the Regular Army in status as the Grenadier Guards, and who are determined to fight for every inch of ground in every viJIage and in every street.
That would be the final answer, if any were needed, to the objection that the Home Guard was a body of jranc-tireurs. Not long afterwards it underlined Mr Churchill's words by shooting down a German bomber that had ventured within range of rifle fire, 'and it is prepared to repeat the performance whenever an opportunity may occur.
It must have been about the S3:me time that the War Office decided to send large reinforcements to General Wavell, enabling him ultimately to pulverize the forces of Graziani and liquidate most of the Italian Empire in Africa. Sir Robert Gordon-Finlayson, the head of the Western Command, has stated publicly that ({it would not have been possible to have sent outso many men and so much equipment if the Home Guard had not been there to block the path of an enemy landing on these shores."12 The Home Guard was not aware that it had this special responsibility, but it needed no admonition to take its duties seriously, for the great battle of 12Daily Sketch, F:eb. 2, 1941. the air was a continual reminder that this island had attractions ' for the German High Command. Every fine day-and most days were fine-from the second week in August to the third week in September crowds of white dots appeared in the sky; puffs of smoke were emitted in all directions, and at frequent intervals tiny figures could be seen descending to the earth. At the end of the day it would be announced that thirty, fifty, eighty, or more than a hundred Heinkels and Messerschmitts had been brought down. 13 The Royal Air Force also suffered losses, as was inevitable, ' but not, as a rule, more than a third of the German casualties in machines or a sixth in pilots. The hills surrounding Dover collected, it was said, the largest assembly of newspaper correspondents to be seen anywhere in the world. In the streets,-trains, and buses, questions about the "lunch score" were asked and answered as regularly as in times when a county cricket match was the event of the day. On one occasion the B.B.C. broadcast a running commentary by a man who had been famous for his verbal descriptions of sporting contests, but in some quarters the experiment was disapproved, and it was not repeated.
The first three days would have been enough to demonstrate that the attempt to gain mastery of the air on this side of the 13In some neutral countries there was an inclination to doubt the accuracy of the official figures and to suppose tha t the truth must lie somewhere between them and the claims of the German Propaganda Department. The fact is that the Air Ministry drew up its bulletins in the manner of a cautious and somewhat unimaginative Civil Servant, never counting any German machine in the total unless it had been actually seen to crash, however badly it might have been damaged and however small its chance of completing the return journey. See Sir Archiband Sinclair's answer to questions on the subject in the House of Commons on August 21, 1940. Air Commodore Goddard has stated recently that in his beljef the Germans lost not less than 220 planes on September 15, though the Air Ministry claimed only 185.
The decisive fact is that the Germans finally broke off the contest without having achieved anything. What conceivable reason could they have had for doing so if, wit,h the advantage of superior numbers at the beginning, they had inflicted those immense losses, at little cost to themselves, of which they boasted after each of the battles? If half their claims were true they must have had decisive victory within their grasp at the time when they discontinued the attack, or, for that matter, long before. ' Since the above was written the full story' of our victory has been told in The Bailie oj Britain, reviewed in the preceding section of "The War and Opinion."
Channel was a hopeless failure, but the wooden German mind could not adjust itself to a fact outside its calculations. The only rule it knew was to try, try, and try again. In time it became evident that the Luftwaffe was not only defeated but demoralized. The ratio of German to British losses increased from an original three or four to one to seven or eight to one. German pilots who ha' d been in England before the-war crashed from no apparent cause, and admitted that they were glad to be back here as prisoners. Others, who were genuine casualties, stated that they had been warned not to let themselves be captured whatever happened, as the English always tortured any German who fell into their hands. From this it may be inferred that the German High Command did not trust the fighting spirit of its airmen.
On the night of September 14, the Home Guard received an order which had better not be quoted, but was taken as an intimation that the flat-bottomed barges might make their appearance at any moment. Much had happened since June, and though the Germans could not be prevented from setting -out on the great misadventure, there was considerable confidence that they could be preven ted from ever getting back. What secret information the War Office may have had is ,not revealed, but it is a fact that the next morning, September 15, the fields of Kent were strewn with more heaps of wreckage than had ever been seen before. The Ge,rmans had made their supreme effort. According to the official , figures they lost 185 fighters and bombers, with, of course, the whole of their crews; the British lost twenty-five fighters, hut twelve of the pilots made safe landings. After that the attacks diminished in intensity, and by the end of the month they had ceased entirely. In two months the Germans had lost over two thousand aircraft and over six thousand trained airmen, presumably the cream of the Luftwaffe.
Whether the battle is to be renewed during the coming summer may-well be known before these words appear in print. At pres~nt it seems unlikely, as the Royal Air Force is stronger, both absolutely and relatively to the Luftwaffe, than it was last autumn, and is assured of technical superiori ty for as long as can be foreseen. 14 For the Home Guard, therefore, the prospect is one of alert and strenuous inactivity. But it is usual to insure against fire and HSee Sir Archibald Sinclair's statement in the House of Commons on March 11, 1941. burglary however well protected the house may be, and the Home Guard supplies the equivalent of that last precaution. It is true that, in circumstances only just imaginable, the insurance might be inoperative. If by means of some secret weapon the Germans could gain that complete, unchallengeable con'trol of the air which they had in the Polish campaign, no army, amateur or professional, could offer any effective resistance. Factories, docks, aerodromes, and every kind of military establishment would be bombed out of existence. Even the Navy would be thrown on the defensive, and it is doubtful whether it could defend itself indefinitely.
That may be dismissed as the German dream of Paradise, already vanishing before the morning' headache. There is another possibility which might have been realized if the battle had been fought in June instead of in August and September, and which must, in theory, be taken into account for the future. Without achieving a decisive victory, the Germans might have won some temporary suc~esses at a few places. With careful management and a certain degree of luck they might have gained control of a suitable landing ground and deluged an undefended area with the contents of troop-carrying planes. In time the marauders would have been rounded up by the regular Army; but the regular Army cannot be everywhere at once, and an immense amount of damage might have been done even in a few hours. If the process had been repeated several times in different places the defences might have been perceptibly weakened, and the way prepared for an invasion from the sea.
The Home Guard is an effective shield against this kind of danger. Its one advantage over the regular Army is that it can be, and is, almost literally, everywhere at once. It covers the country from end to end like the prickles of a hedgehog. No large area of Great Britain is entirely unpopulated, and wherever there is population there is the Home Guard. In any district, however scattered, it could muster greater numbers than could be landed by surprise tactics from troop-carrying planes. It would probably be able to ensure that the landing itself should be attended with disaster; for most units of the Home Guard include a sprinkling of marksmen of no ordinary skill. 15 Failing that, it would be able 16Although aircraft often manage to limp back to their bases in spite of severe damage by shell-fire, it remains true that the strongest machine ever built can be brought down by a single rifle bullet if hit in a vital spot at shoTt range.
So I have been told by a Group Captain of long experience.
